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Summary 
On 10 November 2011 the EU Court of Justice handed down its eagerly anticipated 
judgment on two cases referred by the UK courts involving the Rank Group plc and Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC).  The disputes arose in the context of gaming 
activities, namely bingo and slot machines, and raised significant questions over the 
application of the principle of fiscal neutrality.  The EU Court of Justice ruled that, where 
two gaming services are comparable from the point of view of the average customer and 
meet the same needs of that customer, under the principle of fiscal neutrality, they must 
be regarded as similar and receive the same treatment for VAT purposes. Whilst the 
decision has obvious implications for the interpretation of the gambling exemption, it will 
most likely also have far more reaching implications for the application of the principle of 
fiscal neutrality to VAT exemptions more generally, as well as to other areas of the tax 
such as rates’ structures. 
 
Background to the Rank Group case 
The UK is amongst the Member States which make use of the option granted in Article 
135(1)(i) of the VAT Directive by taxing only some types of gambling.  Whilst that 
provision exempts in principle gambling from the tax, it also allows Member States some 
level discretion when establishing the scope of that exemption, by stating that this is 
“subject to the conditions and limitations laid down by each Member State”.  As already 
acknowledged by the Court in Leo-Libera (Case C-58/09, [2010] ECR I-5189), that level 
of discretion allows States to exempt from tax only certain forms of gambling, but not 
others.  In this context, the UK excludes from the scope of the exemption essentially two 
types of gaming services: 
- the granting of a right to take part in a game in respect of which the stake is lower 
than or equal to 50 pence and the prize lower than or equal to GBP £25. 
- the provision of a gaming machine. 
The case in Rank is not the first time that these UK VAT rules on gambling are under the 
spotlight, having given rise to significant litigation in the last decade.  Indeed not only is 
there considerable case law at domestic level, but these rules have already been at the 
centre of EU Court of Justice cases.  At national level, just in the last year there have 
been six courts’ judgments on the gambling rules and the right to deduct of gaming 
businesses, as follows: Cosmo Leisure (First-Tier Tribunal, Tax Chamber, 25 February 
2011, [2011] UKFTT 143); Deandrake (First-Tier Tribunal, Tax Chamber, 14 April 2011, 
[2011] UKFTT 250); Dransfield Novelty (First-Tier Tribunal, Tax Chamber, 26 May 2011, 
[2011] UKFTT 348); British Association of Leisure Parks, Piers and Attractions (First-Tier 
Tribunal, Tax Chamber, 12 October 2011, [2011] UKFTT 662); Rating Report (First-Tier 
Tribunal, Tax Chamber, 9 November 2011, [2011] UKFTT 721); and London Clubs 
Management (Court of Appeal, 18 November 2011, [2011] EWCA Civ 1323).  These 
levels of litigation are partly fuelled by, at the same time as reason for, significant 
commentary and analysis (see amongst others K. Killington, “United Kingdom: floor-
based method of apportionment” (2010) International VAT Monitor 21(6), 469).  At EU 
level there have also been two significant cases concerning the UK rules:  United 
Utilities (Case C-85/05), on the application of the gambling exemption to outsourced 
activities, namely the provision of call centre services to a telephone bookmaking 
organiser (for comment see C. Reece, “Call Centre” (2002) Tax Journal 645, 23) ; and 
RAL (Case C-452/03), on the so-called aggressive VAT planning, one of the first cases 
concerning the application of the principle of prohibition of abuse of law to VAT (for 
comment see R. de la Feria, “’GAME OVER’ for Aggressive VAT Planning? RAL v. 
Commissioners of Customs & Excise” (2005) British Tax Review 4, 394-401). 
The phenomenon is not, however, exclusive to the UK: in the last decade there has 
been a noteworthy increase in judgments of the EU Court of Justice concerning the 
interpretation of the VAT gambling exemption, with the German cases in Linneweber in 
2005 (Case C-453/02, [2005] ECR I-1131), and Leo-Libera in 2010 (Case C-58/09, 
[2010] ECR I-5189); and just recently the Belgium case in Henfling (C-464/10, [2011] 
ECR I-000).  Whilst this increase can be partly explained by the overall augment of the 
Court’s case law on exemptions, it is also true that the level of discretion afforded to the 
Member States by the VAT Directive insofar as the gambling exemption is concerned is 
particularly prone to giving rise to a “creeping case law” phenomenon. 
 
The decision of the EU Court of Justice in Rank Group 
Rank is the representative member of a VAT group which operates bingo clubs and 
casinos in the United Kingdom in which customers have access to mechanised cash 
bingo and slot machines.  In 2006 it brought two separate actions before the UK VAT 
Tribunal against HMRC for refusal to repay VAT allegedly overpaid on supplies of bingo 
and slot machines gaming, respectively.  At stake in both cases was the respect for the 
principle of fiscal neutrality and its scope of application insofar as the VAT exemption for 
gambling was concerned. 
Insofar as the bingo case was concerned, Rank’s claim was that different types of bingo 
were treated differently for the purposes of the VAT exemption: mechanised cash bingo 
was exempt only if the stake was lower than or equal to 50 pence and the prize lower 
than or equal to £25.  It was accepted by the parties that, more both types of bingo were 
identical from the consumers’ perspective.  HMRC’s defence was that the different 
treatment did not imply a breach of the principle of fiscal neutrality since there was no 
evidence that this difference in treatment had affected competition between those 
games.  The VAT Tribunal, however, dismissed this argument, ruling in favour of Rank.  
Following proceedings at national level, the case was sent to the Court of Appeal, which 
referred the case to the EU Court of Justice. 
In relation to the slot machines action, the central question was whether these machines 
should be regarded as “gaming machines” and as such excluded from the scope of the 
VAT exemption.  Rank’s main argument was that other type of slot machines had 
already been deemed not to be “gaming machines” for the purposes of VAT by HMRC, 
so that treating these slot machines as such was in breach of the principle of fiscal 
neutrality.  Similarly to the bingo action, it had been accepted by the parties that both 
types of slot machines were identical from the customers’ perspective.  HMRC’s defence 
was again that these two categories of machines were not in competition with each 
other. 
In this context – and whilst there were other minor questions asked – the main question 
by the two referring courts to the EU Court of Justice was essentially whether the 
principle of fiscal neutrality must be interpreted as meaning that a difference in treatment 
for VAT purposes of two supplies of services which are identical or similar from the point 
of view of the consumer and which meet the same needs of the consumer is sufficient to 
establish an infringement, or this requires in addition that the actual existence of 
competition between the services in question or distortion of competition because of the 
difference in treatment be established. 
In this regard, the Court crucially ruled that difference in treatment of two supplies of 
services which are identical or similar from the point of view of the consumer and which 
meet the same needs of the consumer is sufficient to establish an infringement of the 
principle of fiscal neutrality.  Consequently, the actual existence of competition between 
the services in question or of distortion of competition due to the differences in treatment 
was deemed by the Court as not to be an additional condition, and unnecessary to 
determine the existence of such an infringement.  Similarly deemed irrelevant was the 
fact that two fames fell into different licensing categories and were subject to different 
legal regimes relating to control and regulation.  The Court further clarified that in order 
to establish whether two types of gambling machines are identical from the point of view 
of the consumer and fulfil the same needs, the matters to take into account are, inter 
alia, the minimum and maximum permitted stakes and prizes and the chances of wining. 
The consequences and implications of the judgment in Rank Group 
Following the Court’s judgment in Rank Group HMRC issued a statement, dated 8 
December 2011, where it reads: 
“Bingo – In view of the EU Court of Justice, HMRC accepts that the issue is now 
resolved in respect of bingo and our appeal in this respect will be withdrawn. (…) 
Gaming Machines – HMRC believes that the judgment of the ECJ does not provide a 
final determination of the domestic litigation.  Further consideration of the gaming 
machines appeal will now have to take place with the parties and the domestic courts 
using the judgment of the ECJ for guidance.  Accordingly out appeal will continue.” 
For the most part, therefore, the litigation in Rank Group seems to be broadly settled.  
That however might not be the end of the matter. Indeed, the relevance of the Rank 
Group judgment for VAT can hardly be overestimated.  Whilst the decision has obvious 
implications for the interpretation of the gambling exemption, it will probably also have 
far more reaching implications for the application of the principle of fiscal neutrality to 
VAT exemptions more generally, as well as to other areas of the tax such as rates’ 
structures.  Consequently – and bearing in mind the creeping case-law phenomenon 
that characterises the EU Court of Justice’s judicial interventions on VAT – this judgment 
has the potential to give rise in the near future to more litigation, concerning in particular 
the application of the principle of fiscal neutrality. 
Implications of the judgment for the VAT gambling exemption 
Following Leo-Libera (Case C-58/09, [2010] ECR I-5189), it was clear that the level of 
discretion granted to Member States under Article 135(1)(i) of the VAT Directive allowed 
those States to exempt from tax certain forms of gambling, but not others.  Equally clear 
from previous case law, however, was that such discretion was limited by the principle of 
fiscal neutrality.  In Fischer (Case C-283/95, [1998] ECR I-3369) the Court had ruled that 
a Member State may not impose VAT on the unlawful operation of roulette, when the 
corresponding activity carried out by a licensed public casino is exempt.  It stated in that 
case that: 
“[…] the principle of fiscal neutrality precludes a generalised distinction from being 
drawn in the levying of VAT between unlawful and lawful transactions. It follows that 
Member States cannot reserve the exemption solely to lawful games of chance.” 
(para. 28) 
More recently, in Linneweber (Case C-453/02, [2005] ECR I-1131) the Court decided 
that a different treatment for VAT purposes between public gambling and private 
gambling, where the first is deemed to be exempt and the second taxable, was not 
acceptable either.  Invoking again the principle of fiscal neutrality, the Court established 
that the identity of the supplier was irrelevant for the purposes of the VAT gambling 
exemption, stating that: 
“[…] it must be observed that it is clear from Article [135(1)(i) of the VAT Directive] 
that gambling is in principle to be exempted from VAT but that the Member States 
retain the power to lay down the conditions and limitations of that exemption 
(Fischer, paragraph 25). 
However, in exercising that power, the Member States must respect the principle of 
fiscal neutrality. According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, that principle 
precludes, in particular, treating similar goods and supplies of services, which are 
thus in competition with each other, differently for VAT purposes[…] 
the identity of the manufacturer or the provider of the services and the legal form by 
means of which they exercise their activities are, as a rule, irrelevant in assessing 
whether products or services supplied are comparable. […] 
It follows that, in exercising their powers under Article [135(1)(i) of the VAT Directive], 
that is to say, the power to determine the conditions and limitations subject to which 
the operation of games of chance and gaming machines is to be exempted from the 
VAT provided for by that provision, the Member States cannot validly make that 
exemption dependent upon the identity of the operator of such games and 
machines.” (paras. 23, 24, 25 and 29) 
The limiting role of the principle of fiscal neutrality, insofar as the gambling exemption is 
concerned, has therefore been clear for several years.  In this regard it is worth 
emphasising that in Rank Group, HMRC never denied the applicability of the principle of 
fiscal neutrality to the discretionary power of the UK to determine the scope of the 
exemption.  Instead, the main argument presented was that the distinction did not 
infringe that principle because there was no evidence that the difference in VAT 
treatment of the two types of gaming in question had affected competition between 
them.  Thus, what had been lacking until now was the criteria for establishing whether or 
not there is an infringement of the principle of fiscal neutrality.  We knew that a lawful / 
unlawful or a public / private distinction was unacceptable, the question was then what 
was acceptable?  The answer has been implicitly given in Rank Group.  The Court 
established here that a distinction was not acceptable where the services were 
comparable from the point of view of the customer and met the same need of the 
customer.  A contrario therefore, Member States can treat different types of gambling 
differently for VAT purposes only where the following conditions are fulfilled: 
- they are not comparable from the point of view of the customer; or 
- they do not meet the same needs of the customer. 
Implications of the judgment for the interpretation of VAT exemptions 
When determining the scope of any of the exemptions listed in the VAT Directive 
consideration must always be given to the general interpretative principles developed by 
the Court and applicable to all those exemptions.  In particular, three principles are worth 
noting: the principle of strict interpretation of exemptions, the principle of contextual 
interpretation of exemptions, and the principle of uniform interpretation of exemptions. 
Of these the principle of strict interpretation is probably the one which is most often used 
by the Court when interpreting exemptions.  In fact, the Court has consistently held that 
the exemptions provided for in Articles 132, 135 and 136 of the VAT Directive “are to be 
interpreted strictly since they constitute exceptions to the general principle that turnover 
tax is to be levied on all services supplied for consideration by a taxable person”(see 
cases 253/85, Commission v. United Kingdom, [1988] ECR 817; 122/87, Commission v. 
Italy, [1988] ECR 2685; C-453/93, W. Bulthuis-Griffioen, [1995] ECR I-2341, C-212/01, 
Unterpertinger, [2003] ERC I-13859; and C-86/09, Future Health Technologies, [2010] 
ERC I-5215, all of which regarding the interpretation of the exemption applicable to 
medical services [Art. 132(1)(b)]; C-149/97, Institute of Motor Industry, [1998] ECR I-
7053, regarding the interpretation of the exemption applicable to trade unions [Art. 
132(1)(l)]; and C-150/99, Stockholm Lindopark, [2001] ECR I-493, on the interpretation 
of the exemption applicable to sport organizations [Art. 132(1)(m)]). Furthermore, it is 
interesting to note that – whilst the Court has at times departed from this position (see 
e.g. case C-2/95, SDC, [1997] ERC I-3017 as regards the financial services exemption – 
its preference for a strict interpretation of exemptions has manifested itself both as 
regards the services providers (subjective scope of the exemption), and the type of 
services which may be exempt (objective scope of the exemption). 
Yet, the Court has increasingly departed from this strict interpretation, in order to ensure 
respect of the principle of fiscal neutrality and of its corollary, the principle of VAT 
uniformity, which precludes similar goods from being treated differently for VAT 
purposes (see amongst others, cases C-76/99, Commission v. France, [2001] I-249; C-
307/01, d’Ambrumenil, [2003] ECR I-13989; and C-106/05, L.u.p., [2006] ECR I-5123, all 
of which regarding the interpretation of the exemption applicable to medical services 
[Art. 132(1)(b)]; C-216/97, Gregg, [1999] ECR I-4947, on the interpretation of the 
exemptions applicable to medical services and that applicable to welfare and social work 
[Art. 132(1)(b) and (g)]; C-124/96, Commission v. Spain, [1998] ECR I-2501; C-174/00, 
Krennemer Golf, [2002] ECR I-3293, both on the interpretation of the exemption 
applicable to sport organizations; and C-144/00, Hoffman, [2003] ECR I-2921, regarding 
the interpretation of the exemption applicable to cultural services [Art. 132(1)(n)]. 
The gambling exemption is a perfect example of this recurrent struggle between the 
principles of strict interpretation and fiscal neutrality (a struggle first noted by C. Amand 
in “VAT for Public Entities and Charities – Should the Sixth Directive Be Renegotiated?” 
(2006) International VAT Monitor 6, 433-443).  In Leo-Libera (Case C-58/09, [2010] ECR 
I-5189) the Court implicitly opted for strict interpretation, dismissing the fiscal neutrality 
argument:  
“That principle cannot, if it is not to deprive Article 135(1)(i) of Directive 2006/112 and 
the broad discretion which that provision grants to Member States of all 
effectiveness, be interpreted as precluding one form of gambling from being exempt 
from the payment of VAT while another form of gambling is not, in so far, however, 
as the two forms of gambling are not in competition with one another.” (para. 35) 
However, as highlighted above, in all other gambling cases the Court went the opposite 
way, opting for extending the scope of the gambling exemption at the expense of fiscal 
neutrality: in Fischer (Case C-283/95, [1998] ECR I-3369) the Court had ruled that a 
Member State may not impose VAT on the unlawful operation of roulette, when the 
corresponding activity carried out by a licensed public casino is exempt; in Linneweber 
(Case C-453/02, [2005] ECR I-1131) it decided that a different treatment for VAT 
purposes between public gambling and private gambling, where the first is deemed to be 
exempt and the second taxable, was not acceptable; and more recently in Henfling (C-
464/10, [2011] ECR I-000) it ruled that outsourcing or subcontracting of gambling 
activities can still fall within the scope of the exemption.  The judgment in Rank Group 
represents yet another signal that the Court is becoming more and more willing to depart 
from the general held principle of strict interpretation of exemptions, in defence of fiscal 
neutrality – which in itself demonstrates another point, namely the increased significance 
of the principle of fiscal neutrality within the EU VAT system. 
Implications of the judgment for the application of the principle of fiscal neutrality 
In Rank Group the Court was dealing with VAT exempt – or not exempt – services, but 
as it has stated before, and reiterated again now (see para. 34 of the Rank Group 
decision), the principle of VAT uniformity, or equal treatment, as a corollary of the 
general principle of fiscal neutrality also applies to goods, in particular in the context of 
the application of reduced rates of VAT.  Until now, however, the criterion used to 
determine the application of the principle of fiscal neutrality seemed to have been 
whether the goods were or not in competition with each other.  As opposed to what the 
Court seems to be indicating in Rank Group, in Commission v France (Case C-481/98, 
[2001] ECR I-3369), whilst acknowledging the relevance of fiscal neutrality and its 
corollaries, the Court went on to say: 
“It is clear that, in introducing and maintaining in force a VAT rate of 2.1% solely for 
reimbursable medical products, the French legislation did not, and does not infringe 
the principle of fiscal neutrality.  Reimbursable and non-reimbursable medical 
products are not similar products in competition with each other […] Once included in 
the list of reimbursable products, a medical product will, vis-à-vis a non-reimbursable 
medical product, have a decisive advantage for the final consumer […] Consequently 
it is not the lower rate of VAT which provides the reason for his decision to 
purchase.” (paras 25 and 27) 
More recently in Commission v Netherlands (Case C-41/09, [2011] ECR I-000) the Court 
put again the emphasis on the non-competing nature of the products: 
“Taking their respective uses into account, a horse destined for slaughter is not 
similar to a racehorse or a pet horse where the animal is sold as such […] those 
categories of horses are not in competition, meaning that they can be subject to 
different rates of VAT” (para. 66) 
It is clear that in Rank Group the Court adopted a new approach to fiscal neutrality, so 
the question is then whether the new criteria set out in that ruling will have implications 
for the Court approach to VAT rates structures.  Some have already been defending that 
it will, stating that it is “highly likely” that the criteria laid down in Rank Group will affect 
the application of VAT rates particularly to food, and that “the entire fabric of the manner 
in which VAT is applied to food will have to be re-examined” (see V. Sloane, “VAT Focus 
– Rank and Fiscal Neutrality” (2011) Tax Journal 1101, 20, 18 November 2011). 
In truth, there are indeed indications that the Court might be soon looking more closely 
into VAT rates applicable to food.  In the recent decision in Bog (Case C-497/09, [2011] 
ECR I-000) the Court was asked to interpret the term “foodstuff” in Category 1 of Annex 
III to the VAT Directive.  Without ever referring to fiscal neutrality, the Court clearly 
departed from the preferred method of strict interpretation of exceptions to the general 
rule, by adopting a broad meaning of the term, stating that “the provision in question 
refers to foodstuffs in general and makes no distinction or restriction” (para. 85).  Also 
significant is the fact that in Rank Group the Court relied upon an old judgment 
concerning excise duties, Roders and Others (Joint cases C-367/93 to C-377/93, [1995] 
ECR I-2229). The Court had been asked in that case to consider the similarity of fruit 
wines and grape wines for the purposes of excises.  Although the final decision was left 
to the national court, the following guidance was given: 
“According to the settled case-law of the Court, which has interpreted the concept of 
similarity widely, in order to determine whether products are similar it is necessary to 
consider whether they have similar characteristics and meet the same needs from 
the point of view of consumers, the test being not whether they are strictly identical 
but whether their use is similar and comparable.” (para 27) 
Should this approach to fiscal neutrality in fact spread to rates in such a fashion, the 
Rank Group case could go down in VAT history as the ruling that initiated a true 
revolutionary process in domestic VAT systems.  For the first time since the 
Approximation of VAT Rates Directive in 1992, and despite the Court’s previously timid 
approach to these matters, Member States’ freedom to establish their own rates’ 
structures might be on the verge of being significantly curtailed.  What could not be 
achieved at legislative and political levels for the last twenty years might be about to 
happen via the judicial route. 
